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Involvement, and Judicial Recusal
Howard W. Brill*
In his article, Professor Ron Rotunda concludes that no
demonstrable linkage exists between campaign contributions
and judicial decisionmaking. The Illinois and Michigan studies
reveal that only 5-10% of campaign funds come from litigants or
their attorneys; that contributions from the candidates frequently
exceed those from interested parties; and that contributors are
commonly dismayed by the decisions of the candidates they
supported.
But entirely apart from the issue of demonstrable linkage is
the question of public perception. Is the public justified in
believing that campaign involvement may influence judicial
decisionmaking? Is the public at ease with the amount of money
raised in fundraising of judicial elections? The Illinois and
North Carolina polls cited by Professor Rotunda indicate that a
substantial majority of respondents believe that campaign
contributions influence judicial decisions. Apart from the oftproposed merit-selection plan, is there an alternative?
In Arkansas, we elect judges, and all indications are that we
will continue to do so. Attempts to change to some variation of
The proposed
a merit-selection plan have been rejected.
Constitution of 1970 included a partial merit-selection plan.'
This Constitution was soundly rejected by the people. Although
the merit-selection plan was not the determining factor in the
defeat, it certainly did not generate popular support.
*Vincent Foster Professor of Legal Ethics & Professional Responsibility, University
of Arkansas School of Law. I met Ron Rotunda when I was a visiting professor at the
University of Illinois in 1978. Nine months later, we, along with Phil Carroll of Little
Rock, Mike Mahony of El Dorado, and Firestone Tire corporate counsel, gathered at the
Holiday Inn in El Dorado. That meeting was in connection with Firestone Tire & Rubber
Co. v. Little, 269 Ark. 636 (1980), which affirmed the Arkansas procedural doctrine that
the timely answer of a defendant inures to the benefit of a defaulting co-defendant.
1.

See Ronald L. Boyer, A New JudicialSystem for Arkansas, 24 ARK. L. REV. 220,

228 (1970).
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Accordingly, the proposed Constitution of 1980 simply asked
the people to later vote on whether to have a judiciary selected
by merit. But the entire Constitution again failed.2 Despite calls
for a merit-selection plan, 3 the revised Article VII contained in
Amendment 80 retained the popular election of trial and
appellate judges. It passed in 2000. If anything, support for the
merit-selection plan has likely declined in recent years in light of
the perceived judicial activism observed in other states. The
focus has shifted to avoidance of the abuses of judicial
elections.4
The focus of my commentary is how the impact of judicial
contributions and involvement in judicial campaigns should
affect judicial recusal. Let me begin with an actual example. In
December 2007, I received a postcard invitation: "Please come
show support for the Re-Election of Chief Justice Jim Hannah."
Holiday refreshments were to be provided; it was described as
"although not a Christmas party but close to it." The event was
hosted by six prominent northwest Arkansas law firms and two
banks. Here is the dilemma: If, within a reasonable period of
time after the reelection party, the banks appear in litigation
before the Chief Justice, is he required to recuse? If the firms
appear before him, is he required to recuse?
Consider also the more recent judicial elections to the
Arkansas Supreme Court. The public campaign filings of newly
elected Justices Courtney Henry and Karen Baker reveal that
attorneys, firms, and Arkansas corporations contributed the5
maximum gifts allowed by law to the justices' campaigns.
Attorneys were prominent supporters of their campaigns. In
which instances are the justices required to recuse?
2.

See Calvin R. Ledbetter, Jr., The ProposedArkansas Constitution of 1980, ARK.

HIST. Q. 53, 53 (Spring 2001). The 1970 Constitution was supported by 43% of the
electorate; the 1980 Constitution, by only 37%. Id.
3. For a discussion of the advantages and disadvantages, see J. Robert L. Brown,
From Whence Cometh Our State Appellate Judges: Popular Election Versus the Missouri

Plan, 20 U. ARK. LITTLE ROCK L.J. 313 (1998); Lawrence H. Averill, Jr., Observations on
the Wyoming Experience with Merit Selection of Judges: A Model for Arkansas, 17 U.

ARK. LITTLE ROCK L.J. 281 (1995).
4.

See Justice Robert L. Brown, Toxic Judicial Elections: A Proposed Remedy,

ARK. LAW. 12 (Fall 2009). (suggesting judicial-campaign oversight committees, voters'
guides, and public funding of judicial campaigns).
5. Campaign reports are available on the webpage of the Secretary of State.
http://www.sos.ar.gov.
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Some historical perspective may be helpful. The Code of
Judicial Conduct was adopted in Arkansas in 1973;6 it was
revised in 1993; and the current version became effective in
From the beginning, the Arkansas Code of Judicial
2009.
Conduct has provided that a judge is to recuse when the
impartiality of the judge might reasonably be questioned.8
Likewise, the case law has provided that the impartiality of the
judge is raised by the judge sua sponte or in response to a
party's motion. The issue of recusal is considered solely by the
judge. Nothing requires the judge to seek the advice or guidance
of fellow judges; nothing requires a judge to explain a decision
to withdraw or not to withdraw.
In addition to the general rule of recusal when the
impartiality might reasonably be questioned, the Code also
contains four specific instances when a judge "shall disqualify
himself or herself': personal knowledge of the judicial matter,
financial involvement with the parties, family relationships, or
prior involvement with the case as an attorney. Arkansas case
law is extensive in each of these situations.9
As for illustrations of when the impartiality of the presiding
judge might reasonably be questioned, consider the following
scenarios: (1)the defendant is the University of Arkansas, and
the judge is a Razorback supporter;10 (2) the defendant is the
School of Law, and the judge is a law school graduate, financial
contributor to the law school, and occasional lecturer at the law
school;" (3) the dispute involves Christmas light displays, and

6. See Howard W. Brill, The Arkansas Code ofJudicial Conduct, 35 ARK. L. REV.
247 (1981).
7. See Howard W. Brill, The Arkansas Code of Judicial Conduct of 2009, 2009

ARK. L. NOTES 1.
8. See Ark. Code of Jud. Conduct R. 2.11 (2009).
9. See the case law collected in HOWARD W. BRILL, ARKANSAS PROFESSIONAL
AND JUDICIAL ETHICS 510-15 (8th ed. 2011) 510-515.
10. Gray v. Univ. of Ark., 883 F.2d 1394 (8th Cir. 1989) (trial judge who was a
partner of a law firm with a member of the Board of Trustees five years earlier was not
required to recuse).
11. Katz v. Looney, 733 F. Supp. 1284 (W.D. Ark. 1990) (judge refused to
disqualify himself based upon an allegation that he and "all or at least most of the
defendants" were "extremely good friends" because no reasonable person could believe
that his impartiality would be affected due to casual acquaintances with some of the
defendants).
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the judge has previously visited the display;' 2 and (4) the judge
has an association with advocacy groups who have taken
positions in the litigation. 3
Issues of impartiality, bias and prejudice are, initially,
subjective matters that are particularly within the heart and
knowledge of the trial judge. Whether a judge has become so
biased that he should disqualify is a matter generally left to the
judge's discretion. An appellate court will reverse only upon
an objective demonstration of prejudice that was communicated
to the litigants.1 6 Absent an abuse of discretion, the appellate
court will not reverse a decision not to recuse. 17
As adopted by the American Bar Association in 1990, the
Model Code of Judicial Conduct inserted, for the first time, a
provision on campaign contributions and judicial recusal.18
With little discussion, that provision was not recommended to
the Arkansas Supreme Court; the Arkansas Bar Association
Committee on the Code of Judicial Conduct believed that the
size or nature of campaign contributions was not an issue in

Arkansas.

19

The 2007 version of the Model Code of Judicial Conduct
contains language similar to the 1990 Code. Model Rule
2.11 (A)(4) provides that recusal is required if:
(4)The judge knows or learns by means of a timely
motion that a party, a party's lawyer, or the law firm of a
party's lawyer has within the previous [insert number]
year[s] made aggregate contributions to the judge's
campaign in an amount that is greater than [$[insert
amount] for an individual or $ [insert amount] for an entity]
12. Osborne v. Power, 318 Ark. 858, 890 S.W.2d 570 (1994) (judge who had seen
the Christmas lights display had discretion whether to recuse).
13. Patterson v. R.T, 301 Ark. 400, 784 S.W.2d 777 (1990) (chancellor's
association with certain advocacy groups presented the appearance of bias and prejudgment
and required reversal of the decree).
14. Dolphin v. Wilson, 328 Ark. 1,942 S.W.2d 815 (1997).
15. DePriest v. Astrazeneca Pharma.,L.P., 2009 Ark. 547, _
S.W.3d _
.
16.
17.

Sloss v. FarmersBank & Trust Co., 290 Ark. 304, 719 S.W.2d 273 (1986).
Sheridan v. State, 313 Ark. 23, 852 S.W.2d 772 (1993); Pinkston v. Lovell, 296

Ark. 543, 759 S.W.2d 20 (1988).
18. See MODEL CODE OF JUD. CONDUCT Canon 3(E)(1)(e) (1990).
19. Note: the author was the co-chair of the 1991-92 Arkansas Bar Association
Committee on the Code of Judicial Conduct, and the chair of the 2007-09 Task Force.
Some of the comments contained herein are based upon discussions in the meetings of the
committee and the task force.
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[is reasonable and appropriate for an individual or an
entity.] 20
The Task Force decided, as in 1993, that such a provision
concerning a specific dollar amount was inappropriate at this
time2 1 despite the increasing cost of judicial elections. 22
Based on its shared knowledge of Arkansas elections, the
Task Force found no clear connection between campaign
involvement and judicial decisions. However, given the judicial
elections in other states, 23 the Task Force felt that specifically
alerting judges to the concern, and focusing attention on it in a
nondisciplinary manner was appropriate. Accordingly the Task
Force recommended a unique Arkansas addition to the Code,
which was approved by the Arkansas Bar Association and the
Arkansas Supreme Court. Comment [4A] to Rule 2.11 reads:
The fact that a lawyer in a proceeding, or a litigant,
contributed to the judge's campaign, or publicly supported
the judge in his or her election does not of itself disqualify
the judge. However, the size of contributions, the degree of
involvement in the campaign, the timing of the campaign
and the proceeding, the issues involved in the proceeding,
and others factors known to the judge may raise questions
as to the judge's impartiality under paragraph (A).
Note the three differences between the proposed Model
Rule and the adopted Arkansas comment: (1) the Rule contains a
dollar amount; the comment does not; (2) the Rule ignores
campaign participation or involvement; the comment covers it;
and (3) the Rule is mandatory and enforceable; the comment is
not.
Disqualification is not automatic but instead requires
careful judicial consideration of relevant factors. To illustrate,
the maximum statutory contribution of $2000 to the judicial
20. Model CODE OF JUD. CONDUCT R. 2.11(A)(4) (2007).
21.

See HOWARD W. BRILL, The Arkansas Code ofJudicial Conduct of 2009, 2009

ARK. L. NOTES 1.
22. For example, in the 2010 supreme court elections, candidates Courtney Henry,
Karen Baker, and Tim Fox spent, respectively, $657,451, $340,439, and $444,790 in their
campaigns. See the campaign reports filed and posted on the webpage of the Secretary of
State. http://www.sos.ar.gov/filing-search/index.php/filing/search/new.
23. The Task Force's decision was prior to the Supreme Court decision in Citizens
United. As Professor Rotunda and others have indicated, that decision increases the
likelihood that interested business and other groups will contribute to judicial candidates.
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campaign may not be viewed as significant. However, if the
maximum amount is also given by the lawyer's spouse, the
lawyer's children, and members of the lawyer's firm, further
questions should be asked. If the lawyer merely placed a
judge's bumper sticker on her automobile or allowed her name
to appear in a newspaper advertisement for the judge, most
individuals would probably conclude that these typical and
commonplace election activities do not raise reasonable
questions as to judicial impartiality. However, the answer
would be significantly different if the attorney were the head of
the judge's campaign committee and responsible for raising
funds.
Continuing with the illustrations, if the attorney appears
before the judge three months after the judge assumes the bench,
the issue is more relevant than if that appearance is three years
after the election. The lawyer's appearance before the judge in a
routine child-custody case does not raise eyebrows. But if that
lawyer, prominent in the campaign, appears in a high-profile
personal-injury suit for the plaintiff with the potential of large
attorney fees, or for the defendant in opposing the certification
of a class, any judge should be particularly aware and
considerate of the appearance of impropriety.
Consider the example from the beginning of this
commentary; namely, the event in support of the reelection of
Chief Justice Hannah. What factors may be relevant and should
be considered? Was the Chief Justice in attendance at the party?
Did he have a prior, perhaps long-standing relationship even
before going on the bench, with these law firms? How much
time has elapsed between the time of the holiday party and the
appearance of any of these individuals before the supreme
court? Did the attorneys have primary responsibility for the
appeal, or were they merely on the brief? What was the nature
and magnitude of the litigation?
Remember that in any of these borderline cases, the judge
has an option that falls between the cautious and immediate step
of recusal on the one hand, and a dogged and admirable
determination to fulfill his judicial duties on the other. The
judge is to disclose on the record information that the judge
believes the parties or their lawyers might reasonably consider
relevant to a possible motion for disqualification, even if the
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judge believes there is no basis for disqualification. 24 The
option, authorized by Rule 2.11(c), permits the judge to state on
the record both the basis for disqualification and his reasoned
conclusion that he is able to impartially preside over the matters.
If the parties and the attorney consent in writing to his continued
presiding over the matter, the judge may preside. For example,
the judge may disclose:
Please let the record show that the attorney for the plaintiff
was the head of my election campaign last year, and
contributed the maximum allowable amount to my
campaign. However, despite that, I believe that I am able to
fairly and independently preside over this matter, and I am
certainly willing to do so.
If the matter is a relatively minor property dispute, with
local parties and local attorneys, all may willingly consent.
However, if the matter is a major products-liability case, with a
national corporation as a defendant and out-of-state counsel
admitted pro hac vice, the defendant, or defense counsel, may be
reluctant to consent. The letter and spirit of the rule is that all
parties and all lawyers must consent. A local lawyer may be
willing to consent in order to avoid the risk of antagonizing the
judge, whereas the party itself may be more concerned with the
risk of judicial favoritism. Frank discussion between attorney
and client is an essential prerequisite to any waiver under Rule
2.11(c). As the court has said in another judicial-recusal matter:
if the judge's activities "create in reasonable minds a perception
that the judge's ability to carry out judicial responsibilities with
integrity, impartiality and competence is impaired," 25 the judge
should step aside.
In theory, a judge cannot be disciplined by the Arkansas
Judicial Discipline and Disability Commission for failing to
recuse because of campaign involvement. Placing the guideline
24.

ARK. CODE OF JUD. CONDUCT R. 2.11 cmt. 5 (2009). More than a decade ago,

Justice Brown wrote that "in practice, judges do appear to disqualify from cases involving
their committee chairs," at least in the six months of the campaign itself. Brown, supra
note 4, at 39. Whether recusal also occurs after election is a different matter.
25.

Huffman v. Ark. Jud Discipline and Disability Comm'n, 344 Ark. 274, 283, 42

S.W.3d 386, 392 (2001). On March 19, 2010, the Judicial Discipline and Disability
Commission admonished District Judge Mark Johnson of Sharp County, finding that he
presided over a DWI case against a relative, thus violating Rule 2.11 (A)(2)(a). Jud. DDC
Case #09-261.
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into an advisory/exhortatory comment instead of an enforceable
rule was certainly intended to remove the possibility of
enforcement.
However, in at least one instance, a judge has been
disciplined for failing to recuse. A circuit judge who owned
12,000 shares of Wal-Mart stock with a value of approximately
$700,000 presided over a request for a temporary restraining
order sought by Wal-Mart against a labor union. After first
attempting to find another judge to hear the emergency request,
the judge granted the TRO in favor of Wal-Mart before
subsequently recusing from further action in the matter. For his
brief involvement in the case, the judge was given a letter of
the Arkansas
admonition, the lowest form of discipline,
Judicial Discipline and Disability Commission.
Under the Code, disqualification is mandated only if the
judge's economic interest in a party to the proceeding is greater
than de minimis. Despite the argument that his ownership
interest in Wal-Mart was de minimis in light of the value of
Wal-Mart and that his interest could not be substantially affected
by the litigation;27 the supreme court affirmed the admonition.28
The court focused on the more basic issue of appearances,
particularly appearances in two contexts-the appearance of
impropriety under Rule 1.2,29 and the appearance of partiality
under Rule 2.11. Chief Justice Hannah, writing for a sixmember majority, emphasized the judge's duty to avoid conduct
that would "create in reasonable minds a perception that the
judge's ability to carry out judicial responsibilities with
integrity, impartiality and competence is impaired."30 Although
the opinion also discussed the de minimis financial-ownership
issue, the appearance issue controlled the case.
26. Amendment 66, adopted in 1988, created the Commission. Its powers are
further set out in section 16-10-401 through 16-11-411 of the Arkansas Code.
27. The "de minimis" standard is defined in the Terminology section of the
Arkansas Code of Judicial conduct.
28. Huffinan, 344 Ark. at 285, 42 S.W.3d at 394.
29. The decision was based upon the earlier version of the Arkansas Code of
Judicial Conduct of 1993. Although the Code numbers and rule numbers have changed,
the basic principles have not. For simplicity's sake, I am using the current rule numbers.
30. Huffman, 344 Ark. at 283, 42 S.W.3d at 392.
31. See also Hufinan, 344 Ark. at 283, 42 S.W.3d at 394-95 (Glaze, J., dissenting)
(suggesting that the canons on disqualification because of a financial interest are confusing
in light of the "substantially affected" language).
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Prior to the adoption of Comment [4A] to Rule 2.11, the
only somewhat-applicable guidance to the issue of campaign
involvement and judicial recusal was Massongill v. County of
Scott.32 In a taxpayer's illegal-exaction suit, the plaintiff moved
the circuit judge to recuse on the basis that the attorney for the
defendants had served as the judge's campaign treasurer.
Concluding that he could preside impartially, the judge refused
to recuse. Affirming, the supreme court stated that there is no
duty to recuse when there is no prejudice, and since the plaintiff
had not demonstrated bias or prejudice by the judge, the judge
acted properly. However, in reversing on other grounds, the
court "note[d] the potential for the appearance of impropriety in
the relationship between the trial judge and appellees'
counsel."3 3 It did not expressly require the judge to reconsider
the decision not to recuse. Factors such as when the election
was held, whether it was contested, and whether the defense
attorney was actively involved in fundraising are not answered
in the opinion.
Supposing these cases arise after the adoption of Comment
[4A], how should a judge act? Without trying to be legalistic,
the level of analysis and consideration might be considered as
five steps:
1) Comment [4A] simply says to the judge: consider
all these factors.
2) Case law generally says that a decision whether or
not to recuse is addressed to the discretion of the judge.
3) Comment [5] to Rule 2.11 tells the judge to
disclose the campaign involvement on the record "if the
parties or lawyers might reasonably believe it is relevant to
disqualification."
4) Case law, particularly Huffman v. Judicial
Discipline and Disability Commission, goes further and
says that recusal is appropriate if the judge's activities
"create in reasonable minds a perception that the judge's
ability to carry out the judicial responsibilities with
integrity, impartiality, and competence is impaired"
5) Finally, Caperton v. A.T. Massey Coal Co.
reminds the judge that in unique situations, the failure to
32. 337 Ark. 281, 991 S.W.2d 105 (1999).
33. Id. at 109.
34. 129 S. Ct. 2252 (2009).
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recuse might amount to a denial of due process to the
litigants."

CONCLUSION
We are fortunate that judicial-election controversies have
been infrequent in Arkansas. Comment [4A] to Rule 2.11
properly places the initial burden on the judge to decide
whether, in light of all factors arising out of a judicial campaign,
the judge is capable of presiding with the requisite integrity,
independence, and impartiality.

35. As Professor Rotunda points out, Caperton involved such a rare combination of
factors, that the position adopted by the five-member majority is unlikely to be applicable
to other litigation.

